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Foundation-funded Journalism, Philanthrocapitalism and Tainted Donors 
  
 
 
Abstract: 
Not-for-profit news organisations are increasingly funded by private foundations, supported by 
wealthy entrepreneurs. This raises a range of ethical dilemmas for journalists, which are 
particularly serious when their donors are alleged to have been involved in unethical or illegal 
activities. Although this is a relatively common occurrence in the non-profit sector, so far there 
has been no critical discussion of these issues in relation to foundation-funded journalism. In this 
article, we interrogate a rich and detailed case study of the relations between a nonprofit news 
organisation and a donor accused of being involved in a massive, international fraud scandal.  We 
document how the news outlet justified their acceptance of this donor’s money; the defensive 
strategies they used to protect their reputation, organisational values and editorial freedom; and 
the conditions that ultimately led to journalists parting ways with the foundation. In so doing, we 
draw on ideas about philanthrocapitalism, stakeholders and resource dependence in order to 
develop Dunn’s (2010) model of how nonprofits respond to “tainted” donors. 
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Expensive, time-consuming and specialist forms of journalism are increasingly being squeezed 
out of mainstream news outlets by speed, cost-cutting and role-merging (Örnebring 2016).  So 
niche, non-profit news outlets which focus on particular geographic areas, topics, or forms of 
reporting are becoming an important part of the news ecology (Anon. 2017; Benson 2017; Bunce 
2016). These non-profit news outlets are often heavily dependent on the funding provided by 
private foundations, many of which were created by wealthy entrepreneurs (Rosenstiel et al. 2016; 
Schiffrin 2017).   
 
Yet a recent report by the American Press Institute concluded that the ethics relating to foundation-
funded journalism are “still evolving” (Rosenstiel et al. 2016).  Few non-profit outlets have any 
written ethical guidelines, and the ethical debates in industry circles has tended to be very 
restricted—focusing on issues of transparency and editorial independence (Lemann 2016; 
Rosenstiel et al., 2016). Although critical debates have recently become more nuanced (Benson 
2017; Schiffrin 2017), there has been little discussion about the circumstances in which journalists 
should (or should not) accept money from foundations (Rosentiel et al. 2016). Few non-profit news 
outlets say that they have ever decided to part ways from a foundation, or return monies from a 
foundation grant (Rosentiel et al. 2016).  
 
The lack of ethical discussion about these issues is troubling for several reasons. Firstly, a greater 
share of grants from private funders are now going to media organisations (Rosentiel et al. 2016).It 
has been claimed that non-profit news organisations are particularly popular amongst 
entrepreneurs, who are keen to apply business principles to philanthropic giving (Friedlich 2016). 
These kinds of donors often require non-profit news outlets to generate some commercial income, 
but there can be significant tensions between commercial and other objectives (Benson 2017). 
Such “philanthrocapitalists” have also been accused of lacking transparency in their financial 
dealings, and of conflating private and public interests (McGoey 2015). In particular, there is 
evidence to suggest that business executives accused of misconduct are amongst the most generous 
philanthropic donors to nonprofits, as this “moral window-dressing” helps them to repair damage 
to their reputations (Koehn & Ueng 2010: 1). It is certainly common for other kinds of non-profits 
to experience serious ethical dilemmas when they find out that their donors are alleged to have 
been involved in unethical or illegal activities (Dunn 2010). Yet there has been no discussion of 
how journalists working for non-profit news outlets might cope with these kinds of ethical 
challenges.  
 
It is very difficult to study such issues precisely because non-profit news organisations are so 
dependent on private foundations: understandably, journalists do not wish to jeopardize their 
access to future funding. But without analysing how they negotiate problematic donor relations, 
we can’t hope to have informed, collective discussions about the ethics of non-profit journalism. 
For these reasons, we are deeply grateful to the humanitarian news outlet, IRIN, for allowing us 
the opportunity to discuss the sensitive data we gained during a year-long study of the organisation 
in 2015. During this period, IRIN was largely funded by the Hong Kong based Jynwel Foundation, 
which is run by the Malaysian billionaire, Taek Jho Low.  The Jynwel Foundation made a number 
of generous financial pledges during 2012–2016, totaling at least $176 million. These spanned 
many different kinds of non-profit organisations, including MD Anderson Cancer Center in Texas 
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and Panthera, an organization dedicated to protecting wild cats. However, Low also made generous 
pledges to a number of media-related non-profits, including IRIN, National Geographic’s Pristine 
Seas project, the Motion Picture Television Fund, the Mashable Social Good Summit and the UN 
Foundation, which trains journalists around the world, and runs a news aggregator known as the 
Global Daily.  
 
Low claimed that these pledges sprang from his belief in “disruptive philanthropy” which, he 
argued, involved applying business principles to philanthropic giving in order to make it more 
effective (Jynwel Foundation 2014).  But the timing of Low’s philanthropic pledges is interesting 
because these pledges multiplied in 2014–2015, just as allegations that he was involved in a major 
fraud scandal began to appear in the media. So part of Low’s motivation in giving may have been 
to enhance his reputation for social responsibility and benevolence at a time of serious reputational 
risk. By 2016–2017, Low was alleged to have been involved in embezzling billions of dollars from 
1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB)—a state-owned company tasked with supporting 
economic development projects. The 1MDB scandal has now gone global: it is currently the 
subject of legal investigations in Australia, Hong Kong, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Switzerland, Thailand, UAE, the UK and the USA (Adam & Sam 2016).  
 
In this article, we use 32 semi-structured interviews, internal documents and memos, content 
analysis and extensive ethnographic research to examine how IRIN staff negotiated their 
relationship with the Jynwel Foundation, as allegations mounted against Low. This includes news 
managers, as well as contracted journalists, as the ethical deliberations of both were found to be 
relevant. However, it should be noted that the division between journalists and news managers was 
not clear-cut because IRIN’s managers regularly engaged in journalistic activities, such as running 
editorial meetings and subediting articles, as well as engaging in broader strategic activities. 
Specifically, we ask: why did IRIN managers originally decided to accept the offer of funding 
from the Jynwel Foundation in 2014? What problems did IRIN journalists and managers encounter 
in relations with their donor, and what strategies did they use to cope? Which factors shaped IRIN’s 
decision to part company with the Jynwel Foundation by the end of 2015—even though it had only 
received $2 million out of a promised $25 million? 
 
 This rich (and rare) empirical data is then used to discuss the operation of “philanthrocapitalism” 
in non-profit journalism, drawing from other research on foundation-funded journalism, as well as 
the literature on non-profit organisations. This includes theory about stakeholders, reputational 
risk and resource dependence. However, the main purpose of this critical discussion is ultimately 
to develop Dunn’s model (2010) of why nonprofits part company with donors “tainted” by 
allegations of unethical or illegal dealings. Thus this article has much broader implications: 
speaking to the changing relations between journalism, big business, public relations and the not-
for-profit sector. 
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THE CASE 
  
IRIN was originally established in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, to inform the practices 
of humanitarian agencies, governments and multilateral donors. At that time, IRIN was part of the 
UN’s Department of Humanitarian Affairs - the predecessor of the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). But OCHA decided to cease funding IRIN in 2014, after a series 
of arguments with journalists over editorial independence, which culminated in OCHA allegedly 
attempting to prevent IRIN from reporting on the Syrian conflict (Lynch 2014). IRIN’s departure 
from the UN created significant uncertainty about the organisation’s future, and fifteen members 
of staff left.  However, those who stayed with IRIN in 2015 hoped that a “new IRIN”, funded by 
alternative sources, would be able to exercise greater editorial independence—albeit in ways which 
were shaped by their desire to continue to engage with international aid agencies, which have 
always constituted their most significant audience.  
 
Whilst still part of UN-OCHA, IRIN hired a professional fundraising consultant based in the US, 
who brokered the deal with the Jynwel Foundation in 2014, which commenced in January 2015. 
IRIN managers said that Low encouraged IRIN plan to generate a third of its income from 
commercial sources within five years: something which they weren’t opposed to principle, 
although they weren’t sure how they could do it in practice. The Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) in the UK also agreed to act as a host institution in the interim: accepting funds from the 
Jynwel Foundation on IRIN’s behalf, until IRIN had completed the legal processes necessary to 
acquire the status of an independent foundation in Switzerland. An ODI representative was also 
due to chair IRIN’s board; other members of this prospective board brought extensive expertise in 
law, non-governmental organisations and humanitarian policy-making to the table.  
 
In addition, a handful of other actors advised either IRIN or the Jynwel Foundation about 
philanthropy, business and PR-related issues. All of these actors had different experiences and 
perspectives, as did the fifteen IRIN journalists, who were positioned remotely from one another 
around the world, but collaborated through their virtual newsroom (Anon. in print). So there were 
a number of different legal, ethical and logistical challenges which IRIN managers and journalists 
had to negotiate during 2015, whiche were greatly exacerbated by the mounting allegations against 
their main donor, Jho Low.  
 
At the time of accepting Low’s offer in 2014, IRIN’s managers had been aware of allegations that 
some of Low’s business ventures were being improperly funded by 1Malaysia Development 
Berhad (1MDB), as these had appeared in another non-profit news outlet—The Sarawak Report 
(2014a, 2014b). But throughout 2015, the allegations against Low became much more serious, 
widespread and credible. In February/March, The Sarawak Report and the UK’s Sunday Times 
newspaper obtained what they said were leaked emails suggesting that Low had been involved in 
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misappropriating money given as a loan by  1MDB to the oil exploration and production company, 
PetroSaudi (Malay 2015; Ungoed-Thomas et al. 2015). Media coverage of the allegations then 
spread: moving from niche investigative outlets to mainstream English-language newspapers like 
The New York Times (Story & Saul, 2015) and The Wall Street Journal (Wright 2015). One 
particularly intriguing detail which caught the imagination of the press was that Low’s Hollywood 
connections were alleged to have enabled embezzled money to fund the feature film, The Wolf of 
Wall Street—a black comedy about a corrupt American stockbroker (Story & Saul 2015).   
 
Legal investigations pertaining to 1MDB also began in Singapore and Switzerland during 2015, 
before spreading to a host of other countries in 2016 (Adam & Sam 2016). These included the 
USA: indeed, in 2016, Low was named in the largest set of cases ever brought by the US Justice 
Department’s Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative (Menon et al. 2016). Federal prosecutors 
started action to seize assets worth at least $1 billion from those involved (Menon et al. 2016). 
According to the US Department of Justice filings issued in mid-2017, Low is now alleged to have 
facilitated, and profited from, the embezzlement of billions of dollars from 1MDB (Hope & Wright 
2017).  However, at the time of writing no criminal charges had been brought against Low, who 
has always denied any involvement in illegal activity (Shih 2015).  
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
Our research questions involved asking why IRIN decided to accept the pledge from the Jynwel 
Foundation, and what problems they encountered in their relationship with the foundation, and its 
director, Low. Research into foundation-funded journalism suggests that foundation grants may 
have the potential to free journalists from commercial considerations, so that they can engage in 
journalistic work which is of public value, but which is time-consuming, expensive and unlikely 
to become profitable (discussed in Anon. 2017). However, others have raised concerns that 
philanthropic funding may enable powerful businesspeople to exercise indirect forms of editorial 
influence. These include incentivising journalists to cover particular sorts of topics; causing them 
to alter the framing or tone of journalistic articles; and limiting journalists’ perceptions of the 
sphere of legitimate controversy (Bunce 2016; Edmonds 2002; Feldman 2007).   
 
The risk that journalists’ approaches and content will be influenced by donors is thought to be 
particularly acute when there is a significant overlap between the normative and cultural values of 
journalists and foundation representatives. This is claimed to create a “benevolent fog” which 
disorients journalists and allows them to be more easily led (Browne 2010). Thus, sceptics argue, 
private foundations enable entrepreneurs to re/shape public discourse and policy-making in ways 
which privilege private, technocentric “solutions” to international development challenges, as well 
as suppressing criticisms of globalised capitalism (Curtis 2016; McGoey 2015).  Indeed, 
entrepreneur-led foundations may even re/shape journalists’ perceptions of what journalism is: 
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moving away from professionalised conceptions and their related ethical standards, to less clearly 
defined ideas of "information" (Lewis 2012). 
 
More recent work has become more nuanced: suggesting that there are measures which could 
minimise these kinds of risks (Schiffrin 2017). Our own and others’ empirical work also suggests 
that journalists can exercise considerable agency in negotiating relations with foundations (Anon. 
2017; Conrad 2015; Nee 2011). That’s why we also asked how IRIN managers and journalists 
tried to cope with the problems they encountered in their relationship with their donor.  However, 
as Low claimed to apply business principles to giving (Jynwel Foundation 2014), and wanted IRIN 
to generate some commercial revenue, we think it is appropriate to discuss the coping strategies of 
IRIN staff in relation to another body of work. This involves debates about the extent to which 
non-profit news organisations benefit from engaging with "venture philanthropy" (Friedlich 2016) 
or, as it is more commonly known, "philanthrocapitalism" (Bishop 2006). Such an approach 
involves applying business principles to philanthropic giving to try and make it more effective, 
impactful and sustainable (Bishop & Green 2008). But there can be conflicts between foundations’ 
commercial and social-impact objectives, as well as between the objectives of donors and 
journalists (Benson 2017; Bunce 2016). So further research needs to be done to examine how non-
profit news outlets negotiate the tensions involved in becoming public-commercial hybrids.  
 
Philanthrocapitalists have also been criticised for conflating donors’ personal morality with wealth 
creation in ways which efface the suffering inflicted by capitalism, which has enabled their 
accumulation of enormous personal wealth, whilst millions remain in poverty (McGoey 2015). 
We thought that this aspect of philanthrocapitalism could be particularly problematic for a 
humanitarian news outlet. In addition, McGoey (2015) argues that philanthrocapitalism is 
associated with a lack of organisational accountability and transparency, especially when donors 
take a highly personalised approach to philanthropic giving. It is important not to overgeneralise 
here because the structures of private foundations may differ significantly from one another 
(Schiffrin 2017). However, when Low was challenged for not having an organisational firewall in 
between Jynwel Capital and the Jynwel Foundation, taking a leading role in both, he replied that 
"You should never split it up [because] you have to do it from your head and your heart" 
(Rosenkranz 2015).  
 
One of the reasons why some foundations’ lack of transparency is so worrying is that there is 
evidence to suggest that some business executives use philanthropic donations as a form of “moral 
window-dressing” to divert attention away from allegations of suspect earnings (Koehn & Ueng 
2010: 1). Specifically, Koehn and Ueng (2010) have found that North American firms required to 
restate their earnings following allegations of financial wrongdoing are often amongst the most 
generous philanthropic donors. Restating firms are also some of the most visible givers in the 
media—regularly appearing in magazines’ lists of ethical companies (Koehn & Ueng 2010). This 
has important implications: suggesting that even if donors do not influence the editorial content of 
the news organisation they fund, their largesse is still likely to trigger positive coverage in other 
media outlets. Thus Koehn and Ueng conclude that some businesspeople appear to be trying to 
buy back their good reputations using philanthropic giving—and that this works, at least in the 
short-term.   
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Koehn and Ueng’s study (2010) can be usefully linked to studies of the relationship between 
philanthropy and commercial PR, which stress how vital the news media is in constructing the 
reputations of business leaders, especially perceptions of their social or environmental 
responsibility (Einwiller et al. 2010).  Corporate philanthropists may also benefit from making 
contact with other powerful individuals and groups through their giving (Spedding 2009). But 
although there is a growing interest in foundation-funded journalism, so far there have been no 
studies of how journalists cope with these issues in donor relations, or what it might take for a 
news outlet to part ways with a private foundation.  
 
However, Dunn (2010) has explored the responses of other kinds of nonprofits to allegations that 
their donors were involved in unethical or illegal activities. He examines multiple cases in order 
to suggest what he thinks are the main causal factors shaping whether or not non-profits cut ties 
with donors. He describes these causal factors as involving two internal constraints: economic 
need and organisational commitment. Economic need is relatively straightforward, relating to  how 
much the non-profit depends upon the donor’s money to survive, and cost-benefit tradeoffs. 
Organisational commitment is a little more complicated: building upon the “the notion that a 
decision maker has a psychological obligation to behave in a manner that is consistent with the 
implications of previous decisions” (Dunn 2010, p.115). The organisational commitment of a non-
profit to its donor (and vice versa) is therefore thought to be influenced by individuals’ sense of 
responsibility to see through courses of action which they previously decided upon.  Although 
Dunn argues that this commitment is deepened when parties “continue to have dealings with one 
another” over a period of time (2010: 115), which we take to mean not only repeated financial 
exchanges, but also regular communications and other forms of  non-financial interaction.  
 
Dunn (2010) then goes on to discuss three external pressures: value incongruence, coalescence 
and visibility. Value incongruence is the extent of incompatibility between the “norms, values and 
actions” of the non-profit and its donor (2010: 110). As Dunn stresses, such issues are very 
important to non-profit organisations because of the highly normative nature of their claims to 
legitimacy. However, we also understand this as having broader implications for what are judged 
to be good or appropriate organisational goals and strategic directions.  Dunn then draws on 
seminal work by Mitchell et al. (1997, discussed in Dunn 2010) in order to discuss coalescence. 
In order to do this, he argues that how urgently a non-profit organisation acts to address perceptions 
of value incongruence depends on how many internal and external stakeholders come together to 
express concerns about a particular concern. For these reasons, the visibility of the scandal may be 
crucial, including press coverage.  
 
Dunn (2010) concludes by stressing that more qualitative research needs to be done to test which 
causal factor/s are most salient in shaping non-profits’ responses to their “tainted” donors, and how 
they combine with each other in practice. This article seeks to respond to that call. We develop 
Dunn’s insights (2010) about the need to move away from a narrow focus on donor-recipient 
relations, in order to attend to the relationships between many different stakeholders. In IRIN’s 
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case, this included prospective board members, institutional partners and informal advisors: all of 
whom acted as an interface between the organisation and related fields of activity. However, our 
attention to these actors has meant that we move away from Dunn’s distinction between external 
pressures and internal constraints. Instead, we see the resource dependence of non-profits on others 
as leading to a fuzzy boundary between that which is external, and that which is internal to an 
organisation. 
 
In particular, we want to stress how much small non-profit news outlets rely on multiple 
stakeholders who possess the resources that they need to  survive (Pfeffer 1981; Pfeffer & Salancik 
1978). These include institutional resources (organisational structures, systems, and processes) and 
personal resources (individuals’ time, energy, knowledge and skills and contacts). In order to 
access stakeholders’ resources, IRIN, like other non-profits had to preserve its immaterial 
resources. These included its organisational reputation and related forms of stakeholder goodwill: 
both of which depend on IRIN’s claims to further the public good, and therefore its legitimacy as 
a non-profit (Kong & Farrell 2010; Lister 2003). So IRIN’s acceptance of a pledge from the Jynwel 
Foundation represented the opportunity to become more editorially independent and financially 
secure, but it also posed significant risks relating to its reputation, stakeholder support and access 
to others’ resources. 
 
 
 
METHODS 
  
The research project underpinning this paper took place from November 2014, just before UN-
OCHA’s handover on December 31st, and lasted until December 2015, when IRIN finally parted 
ways with the Jynwel Foundation. It employed three complementary methods: interviewing, 
ethnographic research and content analysis. Semi-structured interviews lasting for an hour to an 
hour and a half were conducted with all IRIN staff on a periodic basis. Stakeholders at ODI, 
prospective board members and informal advisors were also interviewed. Sadly, Low and those 
representing the Jynwel Foundation did not agree to participate. 
 
Our ethnographic research involved observing IRIN’s Skype editorial meetings twice weekly, as 
well as attending the annual staff away day. In addition, we observed journalists’ conversations 
within their online newsroom, hosted on Slack. However, we could not see private messages, and 
were not permitted to attend some sensitive board or branding meetings. We mitigated these 
omissions by triangulating accounts of key encounters using multiple participants and utilising 
internal documentation. All of this data, together with interview transcripts, was analysed using 
NViVO.  
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Given the sensitive nature of the case, we conducted some interviews later and anonymised 
participants, including removing dates when this might lead to an interviewee being identified by 
others in his/her organisation. An early draft of this article was also viewed by IRIN managers but 
although they made constructive suggestions, chiefly about factual details, they did not place any 
pressure on us to portray their organisation in a positive light. This was in keeping with their 
commitment to organisational transparency and editorial independence, which we believe is to 
their credit. 
  
Although we discuss our content analysis extensively elsewhere (Anon. 2017), here it is used 
solely as a means of triangulating the claims of IRIN managers that they were able to resist any 
donor influence over editorial content. This content analysis involved analysing all original, 
English-language outputs between 1 November 2014 and 30h November 2015: so we sampled two 
months when IRIN was still funded by UN-OCHA until the date when IRIN’s relationship with 
Jynwel Foundation ceased.  
 
 
RQ 1: WHY TAKE THE MONEY? 
  
IRIN journalists were passionately committed to acting as a watchdog to the humanitarian 
industry. As one editor said, 
 
I am really genuinely excited about the possibility to kick up s**t by ripping into one of the most 
unaccountable, unchallenged parts of the global economy. I want to hold up to a far higher standard of 
scrutiny the aid system and the UN. 
 
              (Staff consultation quoted in personal email by Manager 2 to all staff, May 27 2015) 
  
So it may seem odd that these journalists chose to work for a news organisation funded by a 
business executive, accused of having undue influence over a state-owned development company. 
However, questions about funding were not treated as a topic for  collective, ethical deliberation, 
but were seen as a largely managerial matter.  
 
IRIN managers explained that they chose to accept the pledge of funding from Low’s Jynwel 
Foundation because, at that time, the accusations against Low were not widespread, only appearing 
in The Sarawak Report (2014a, 2014b). They also believed that these early accusations lacked the 
the credibility and seriousness of later allegations. Moreover, no reason to decline the funding was 
found during due diligence processes, which involved lawyers checking the accounts filed by the 
Jynwel Foundation in Hong Kong (Interview, Manager 1, 16 January 2015; Interview, Manager 
2, 22 January 2015). But such checks depend on the data disclosed by the donor (Spedding 2009), 
10 
 
so the lawyers advised IRIN and its host organisation, ODI, to continue to monitor the situation 
(Interview, ODI representative, 10 April 2015).   
 
IRIN managers’ wariness of the Jynwel Foundation was exacerbated by the growing visibility of 
the 1MDB scandal in the news media (Dunn 2010). By mid January, IRIN managers learned that 
The New York Times was investigating Low (Interview, Manager 1, 16 January 2015). However, 
they really needed the Jynwel money (Dunn 2010) as although IRIN had secured pledges of two 
governmental grants, these were not enough to meet the running costs of the organisation, even in 
its new, reduced form. IRIN managers justified taking money from the Jynwel Foundation by 
saying, 
 
Every donor and institution and country…and philanthropist comes as a package and if we accept money 
from the US government, as one of the biggest arms manufacturers in the world, is that acceptable?... Where 
do you stop? 
So we felt, after a lot of discussion, that as long as there weren’t very clear red lines which we would consider 
to be a violation of the kinds of principles and mandate we stand for, that we would rather be less stringent 
about who will and won’t accept funding from, and rather adopt an approach of transparency. 
(Interview, Manager 2, 22nd January 2015) 
 
Other non-profits have also justified accepting money from questionable sources by removing 
normative gradability—that is, judgements about what is a better or worse course of action (Lawlor 
2009). But this tends to be done in a different way. For example, the Mexican bishop, Ramon 
Godinez, has argued that although the Catholic Church does not knowingly take money from drug 
traffickers, the money would, in any case, be clean because it is “purified once it passes the parish 
doors” (Adams 2005, cited in Dunn 2010: 105). IRIN managers did not take this line: arguing 
instead that since all funding was problematic, the best they could do was to be “transparent” about 
the sources of their income. However, “transparency” about non-profits’ funding only really works 
if donors are also “transparent” about where their money is coming from (Spedding 2009), and 
this is not always the case with philanthrocapitalists (McGoey 2015).  
 
Given their experiences with UN-OCHA, IRIN managers were more concerned about donors 
encroaching on their editorial and organisational independence (Interview, Manager 1, 16 January 
2015). So they took preventative action: drafting IRIN’s statutes in ways which stressed the 
organisation’s commitment to “independent and non-partisan reporting” (Article. 3.2, 2015: 4–5). 
This involved stating their intention to “refute any internal or external pressure to influence 
coverage”, so that they would not “give favourable coverage to advertisers, donors, or special 
interests” (Article 5 2015:8). But IRIN’s draft statutes also state that in order to “maintain [IRIN’s] 
independence, neutrality and credibility”, the organisation would not “accept funding where it 
would be unethical or socially irresponsible to do so” or where “the identity or activity of a 
proposed donor would contradict [IRIN’s] mandate and aims” (Article 7 2015:8). Finally, IRIN’s 
draft constitution addresses operational independence by clarifying how power can and cannot be 
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exercised in the organisation, including specifying the distribution of votes on the board, so that 
no single donor could dominate (Interview, Manager 1, 16 January 2015). 
  
Thus IRIN had far more ethical guidelines formalized in writing than most non-profit news outlets 
which accept foundation funding (Rosentiel et al. 2017). Managers’ efforts to safeguard editorial 
independence appear to have been successful.  As economic development falls outside of the 
humanitarian ‘beat’, we would not have expected coverage of the 1MDB scandal anyway. But the 
Jynwel Foundation’s partnership with the UN Foundation might have been seen as touching upon 
IRIN’s remit. Yet no favourable coverage of Low or the Jynwel Foundation ever appeared. There 
was also no rise in the portrayal of businesses as humanitarian actors and IRIN journalists 
continued to discuss how the structures of globalised capitalism may trigger and perpetuate human 
suffering (Anon 2017). So we found no evidence that foundation funding towed the news 
organisation towards what Feldman calls “safe, legalistic bureaucratic activities and mild 
reformism” (2007: 472). In fact, IRIN’s output became somewhat more critical of the aid industry 
than it had been before it was funded by a private foundation (Anon 2017). However, this finding 
may be partially explained by IRIN’s initial positioning within the UN system, which meant that 
it started off in a position where journalists were far less able to criticise aid agencies than those 
working in the kinds of radical outlets analysed by Feldman (2007). 
 
The reputation of the “new IRIN” for editorial independence helped them attract a number of high-
ranking and experienced editors from prestigious news organisations. New applicants often said 
that this was one of the factors shaping their interest in working for IRIN, despite the precarious, 
short-term contracts on offer (Interview, 22 May 2015; Interview, 15 June 2015; Interview, 10 
March 2016).  Indeed, several said they felt less compromised ethically at IRIN than they had been 
in other news organisations. For instance, one editor claimed that, 
 
In [a Middle Eastern country] most papers… receive some backing from political parties or people with 
political interests…  
I’ve seen it in plenty of papers [that] what you cover or don’t cover is impacted by your donors… But I never 
saw anything like that at IRIN. 
(Interview, 10 March 2016) 
 
Nevertheless, IRIN journalists’ focus on editorial independence meant that many did not seem to 
reflect upon the risk that they were providing Low with reputational benefits, including acting as 
"moral window-dressing" (Koehn & Ueng 2010: 1) for him as allegations of his involvement in 
the 1MDB scandal increased. Nor did IRIN journalists ever speak to us about the possibility that 
IRIN might have inadvertently accepted money misappropriated from 1MDB. Instead, journalists 
tended to argue that as IRIN’s journalism was “independent”, accepting money from the Jynwel 
Foundation did not represent a ‘conflict of interest’ (Interview, 10 March 2016). This risked 
undermining IRIN’s claim to serve the public good as a non-profit, as well as producing a worrying 
split between journalists’ everyday activities and their broader moral/political commitments. As 
another journalist put it,  
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Of course, I would rather not be funded by some, like, potentially corrupt Chinese-Malaysian businessman. 
If I was doing an investigative story, I would try to track down some of his links [to try and verify the 
allegations against him]…  
 
But right now, it’s not interfering with our work.  
(Interview, 13 April 2016)   
  
These journalists’ apparent reluctance to confront the broader implications of the allegations 
against Low may also have been influenced by the scarcity of jobs which would allow them to     
pursue the kinds of specialised, time-consuming and expensive reporting they valued. Indeed, 
some took up posts at IRIN despite strong objections from their peers regarding incongruence 
between their own values and those of their donor (Dunn 2010).  As one new recruit explained, 
  
I knew [Low] was a Malaysian billionaire, I knew he was quite controversial. I knew that my Malaysian 
friends had quite strong opinions that he was considered to be behind many of the political scandals in 
Malaysia…  
But uh, yeah, I guess I’m quite pragmatic about these things…It wasn’t a major consideration for me whether 
or not I took the job. 
(Interview, 10 March 2016) 
 
Therefore IRIN managers legitimised their acceptance of a pledge from the Jynwel Foundation in 
terms of their organisational transparency; due diligence processes; and their (considerable and 
effective) efforts to protect IRIN's editorial and operational independence. Whilst journalists 
tended to focus solely on editorial independence as the key ethical issue which concerned them, 
ignoring any other potential effects of their involvement with Low’s Jynwel Foundation. Certainly, 
none of those who left IRIN during 2015 said that the allegations against Low had shaped their 
decision to depart.   
 
 
RQ 2: WHAT PROBLEMS DID IRIN STAFF ENCOUNTER IN RELATIONS WITH 
THEIR DONOR, AND WHAT STRATEGIES DID THEY USE TO COPE? 
  
Despite their reluctance to confront some of the more difficult ethical issues surrounding their 
association with Low, the commitment of IRIN journalists to watchdog journalism continued to 
make them uncomfortable about taking money from the Jynwel Foundation. Throughout spring 
and early summer, IRIN journalists gestured to their sense of unease in relatively brief and muted 
ways: saying they were “not thrilled” by the funding relationship (Interview, 13 April 2015), that 
it was “not great” (Interview, 10 March 2015) or “perhaps not ideal” (Interview, 29 May 
13 
 
2015).  IRIN journalists then tended to reassure themselves by echoing their managers’ conviction 
that unproblematic donors were impossible to find, so the best thing to do was to remain 
“transparent” about the sources of their income (Interview, 22 May, 2015; Interview, 29 May 
2015).  
 
Only a couple of editors, who had previously worked for news organisations with a commitment 
to impartiality, continued to voice serious concern about the allegations against Low, which they 
were tracking in the media (Dunn 2010). The first editor came close to identifying the possibility 
that IRIN was being used as a form of ‘moral window-dressing’ (Koehn & Ueng 2010: 1). S/he 
said that it was probably “naïve” to believe that there was “sufficient distance” between Low’s 
business dealings and the Jynwel Foundation, because Low seemed to be “throwing his money 
into different philanthropic areas for… PR reasons as much as anything else” (Interview, 22 May 
2015). Whereas the second editor expressed their concern about the ethical tensions between 
IRIN’s values as humanitarian news organisation and Low’s potential involvement in embezzling 
money from a development bank. As s/he put it, 
 
I think the opaqueness of [Low’s] business dealings and where the Jynwel Foundation’s getting its money 
from is of concern…  
I think I should give them the benefit of the doubt [but] if they made their money on the backs of some of the 
issues we complain about in our writing, [then] it would be problematic, to say the least…  
It’s just not clear where all this money is coming from, and it’s such a lot of money…. 
(Interview, 15 June 2015) 
 
But such reflections did not lead these journalists to take any kind of action, other than continuing 
to monitor news coverage of the 1MDB scandal. In particular, the framing of their deliberations 
as personal anxieties, rather than ethical concerns, inhibited them from engaging in any collective 
discussion with other IRIN journalists or the organisation’s managers. For example, these editors 
didn’t discuss their fears at any of the editorial meetings or staff away days we observed, nor was 
there a single mention of the growing allegations against Low within IRIN’s virtual newsroom. 
This was striking because the posts within this newsroom were extensive, amounting to 295,000 
words in total, and involved regular and wide-ranging debate about the nature, purposes and 
parameters of humanitarianism.  
 
However, journalists said that IRIN’s managers had not discouraged them from discussing the 
1MDB scandal in front of us. Instead, they said that they had not engaged in these kinds of 
discussions because they had continued to compartmentalise donor relations as a managerial 
matter, despite the growing allegations against Low (Interview 10 March 2016; Interview, 13 April 
2016). This view was shared by IRIN’s managers, who said they had avoided telling journalists 
about the difficulties which they were having with the Jynwel Foundation because they thought 
that the stress and uncertainty would impact negatively upon them (Interview Manager 1, 7 
October 2015).  
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Yet, IRIN managers had always anticipated that their relationship with the Jynwel Foundation 
might be problematic. In addition to the allegations which emerged against Low, they argued that 
there were marked “cultural” differences between IRIN and what they described as the “glitzy, 
razzmatazz world” of “philanthrocapitalism [or] philanthroentrepreneurialism” in which their 
donor was embedded (Interview, Manager 1, 16 January 2015).  In particular, they were worried 
about the reputational implications of IRIN being associated with a man regularly portrayed in 
mainstream newspapers and gossip blogs as an international playboy. As one put it, 
 
There were concerns about…what accepting funding from [Low] would do to people’s perceptions of us and 
our credibility… 
We are a very serious news organisation that focuses on very serious issues, and to be associated with 
someone who has made the news for very different reasons was difficult and we felt that would reflect [badly] 
on us. 
 (Interview Manager 2, 22 January 2015). 
 
Managers also believed that the kinds of “tycoons” who try to apply business principles to 
philanthropy had expectations about what their generosity would bring them, in terms of 
reputational benefits and social contacts (Interview, Manager 1, 16 January 2015). So the problem, 
as they saw it, was how to give Low what they assumed he wanted, without risking their own 
organisational reputation, or their editorial and operational independence (Interview, Manager 1, 
16 January 2015). Low’s support of IRIN certainly enabled him to acquire some positive media 
coverage from serious broadsheets, such as The Financial Times (Bond 2014) and The Guardian 
(Hatcher 2014). But IRIN’s managers also investigated the possibility of putting on high-profile 
events which would allow Low to celebrate his philanthropy in a very visible way, as well as 
“rubbing shoulders with the great and the good” (Interview, Manager 1, 16 January 2015). Indeed, 
at the behest of IRIN’s fundraising consultant and the PR advisor representing the Jynwel 
Foundation, IRIN managers even investigated the possibility of setting up a celebrity advisory 
committee, so that Low could be associated with the likes of Amal Clooney, Queen Rania of Jordan 
and Arianna Huffington (Interview, Manager 1, 7 October 2015). 
 
But managers’ focus on safeguarding IRIN’s independence appears to have led them to minimise 
the potentially unethical effects of facilitating these social connections. For example, the first 
manager described such events and meetings as ‘shiny things”, which would please their donor, 
but which could do no real harm, because they wouldn’t affect IRIN’s independence (Interview, 
Manager 1, 16 January 2015). However, if IRIN had facilitated Low’s association with such high 
profile and well-respected actors in the field of humanitarianism, this could have greatly enhanced 
the “moral window-dressing” Low gained from funding the news organisation (Kohen & Ueng 
2010: 1). Indeed, such social capital might be far more valuable to donors with reputational 
concerns than influencing the editorial content of a small, niche news outlet. 
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One of the reasons why these strategies never got off the ground was that Low did not present 
IRIN with the problems which its managers anticipated. Rather than having to fend off a pushy 
donor, keen to dominate IRIN, managers struggled with the opposite problem: they were often 
unsure what their main donor thought or wanted. Indeed, Low showed little commitment to IRIN 
as an organisation (Dunn 2010): communicating with them so infrequently that they had to delay 
the processing of important strategic decisions by months. The Jynwel Foundation was also 
somewhat unreliable in releasing promised funds: the first significant tranche arrived so late that 
IRIN could not pay its journalists for several weeks. 
 
IRIN managers saw these problems as stemming from Low’s personalised and centralised 
approach to running the foundation. Indeed, one manager claimed that the Jynwel Foundation was 
largely “run from [Low’s] personal Blackberry” for most of the year (Interview, Manager 1, 7 
October, 2015). In the absence of more frequent dialogue with Low, IRIN managers coped by 
dealing with two other individuals: one of whom also held a powerful position at Jynwel Capital, 
whilst the other was the PR consultant working for the Jynwel Foundation.  IRIN managers had 
the impression that the latter exerted a particularly strong influence over Low in this area and often 
represented his interests at meetings.  
 
However, dealing with these two other representatives introduced other forms of value 
incongruence (Dunn 2010). For example, one of IRIN’s managers said s/he was offended that the 
branding consultants recommended by one of them had insisted on booking premium price tickets 
to fly across the Atlantic for a meeting (Interview, Manager 2, 23 June 2015). But this manager 
then went on to reflect upon her/his initial reaction like this: 
 
We are trying to navigate very different worlds. You know, the very American big money world and the 
more humble NGO development world. 
You think that you have a clear kind of a cultural position, if I can put it like that, and then you get pulled in 
this other direction…And you can see the attraction of that other culture and what that can bring to your 
organisation, and there are parts which you think are absolutely necessary for your [business] growth etc., 
and yet there are other bit of it which [pause] pose red flags. 
And you are not sure [whether] you are just being naïve when you see them as red flags. Is that normal 
practice? Is it just something that you haven’t had to deal with before and, in fact, you are silly to think that 
there is anything wrong with that? Or is it normal to keep having to put your feet down firmly and say “No, 
I am not comfortable with this?” 
I mean you think you have red lines about things and all of a sudden your red lines become orange, green, 
because the more …you get exposed to a range of … ways of looking at things, the more you start to wonder 
if your original perceptions made sense or were just based on a lack of experience 
(Interview, Manager 2, 23 June 2015) 
 
Rather than experiencing confusion due to a “benevolent fog” (Browne 2010) caused by normative 
and cultural similarities with those representing a private foundation, IRIN managers appear to 
have been experiencing the opposite. They were aware of considerable normative incongruence 
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between themselves and those representing their donor, who were enculturated in the world of 
international business. Managers tried to cope with these difficulties by reframing them as 
differences in working culture. But this didn’t quite work: leaving them unsure about how to 
proceed in a way that protected their own values, whilst responding in an appropriate manner to 
their donor’s request that they generate some commercial income. Although IRIN managers were 
not against raising commercial revenue in principle, patchy communication with Low meant that 
questions about how this was to be accomplished, and its implications for IRIN’s values and 
objectives, continued to be sources of considerable tension.  
 
The efforts of IRIN managers to discuss these tensions tended to be hampered by their lack of 
familiarity with commercial branding and marketing processes, so they were sometimes unsure if 
they were being unreasonable or not (Interview, Manager 2, 23rd June, 2015). It was only at the 
branding workshop in July 2015 that IRIN managers identified what they believed was clear 
evidence of serious incompatibilities between IRIN’s values and those of the people representing 
their donor. As one explained:  
 
[Lowe’s PR consultant] said “I just want to clarify with the IRIN team, do you see yourself as a watchdog, 
because that’s not really what I ever thought IRIN was?”…At the same time we had [a Jynwel Foundation 
representative] saying “Why are you guys so obsessed with the UN?”  
 
It was as if that whole aspect of what we do—keeping an eye on the aid industry, being one of the few 
independent voices in the humanitarian sector that can ask questions about where the money is going, how 
the money is being spent, whether it is best serving the needs of people.  
 
All that seemed to have no value for them, from the little that we can gauge. Instead what they want is flashy 
videos and sexy campaigns and things that can mobilise the grassroots.  
 
  (Interview, Manager 2, 9 October 2015) 
 
Indeed, IRIN’s managers believed that those employed by Low were trying to subtly steer IRIN 
towards more populist and upbeat coverage, describing this as involving a “shinier and more 
promotional’ approach to international aid” (Interview, Manager 1, 7 October 2015). Nevertheless, 
the consultant who produced IRIN’s feasibility report, and who was present at this meeting, didn’t 
have the impression that there had been any deliberate conspiracy to alter IRIN’s core mission. 
Instead s/he argued the commercial branding firm and those representing Low’s interests both 
seemed “out of their depth” and “inexperienced” in dealing with the   humanitarian sector, so were 
“just pulling ideas out of the air or from random post-it notes” (Interview, 14 December 2016). 
Certainly, our content analysis showed that IRIN was not coerced into adopting a less critical 
approach to the aid industry following this meeting.  However, the combination of value 
incongruence with weak organisational commitment characterised by sporadic and indirect 
communication (Dunn 2010), led IRIN managers to encounter their most significant difficulty yet: 
their conviction that they did not share a vision for IRIN’s future with those representing their 
donor. 
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RQ 3: WHAT FACTORS CAUSED IRIN TO PART WAYS WITH THE JYNWEL 
FOUNDATION?  
 
By the summer of 2015, IRIN managers were in a very difficult situation. They were trying to cope 
with what they perceived as serious incongruence between their own value-laden aims and those 
of the people representing their donor (Dunn 2010). Weak organisational commitment, manifest 
as infrequent and indirect communications with their main donor, made this much more difficult 
to resolve (Dunn 2010). The increasingly visible nature of the 1MDB scandal in the media greatly 
exacerbated these problems, leading to managers having serious concerns for one of IRIN’s 
greatest immaterial resources—its organisational reputation (Kong & Farrell 2010; Lister 2003). 
This triggered IRIN’s managers step up their efforts to find other donors in order to reduce its 
economic need. But another set of causal mechanisms, combined with these and other factors, 
finally brought about IRIN’s decision to finally part ways with the Jynwel Foundation.  
 
This final set of causal mechanisms related to the misgivings of the people who had promised to 
serve on IRIN’s managerial board, upon whose goodwill IRIN depended to access other resources 
(Kong & Farrell 2010; Lister 2000). The grounding of these stakeholders in more formally 
structured fields of activity meant that they experienced different kinds of value incongruence 
(Dunn 2010). One in particular became alarmed in late summer about the lack of transparency 
which s/he saw as characterizing relations with the Jynwel Foundation. As s/he put it, 
 
It strikes me that the people we had to deal with [at the Jynwel Foundation] are not used to business being 
structured in the way that we [at our organisation] are used to: with clear frameworks, clear governance and 
due diligence processes. 
This ambiguity between staff, friends and other [pause] associates is not something  we are used to—and if 
there is no clarity  about who someone is — that’s an issue for us. They just don’t do due process. 
(Interview, Prospective Board Member 1) 
 
The growing allegations against Low in the media and in different legal jurisdictions also made 
other prospective board members concerned about risks to the reputations of their own 
organisations. As one put it,  
 
At [our organisation] we have to have a very high bar about who we are associated with because we work in 
some very sensitive areas and reputational concerns can impact on our credibility in the field. So we are 
careful about who we officiate with—this was an unacceptable amount of risk. 
(Interview, Prospective Board Member 2) 
 
Indeed, this individual was already considering withdrawing from the prospective board – which 
would have meant IRIN losing access to his/her personal resources. As one of IRIN’s managers 
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explained, losing the access to the “expertise and support” of their “firm allies” at that point would 
have made it extremely difficult to move forward to become an independent foundation (Interview, 
Manager 1, 28 August 2017).   
 
Finally, the institutional resources which IRIN needed to survive were also threatened by the 
allegations against Low. The representative of ODI, IRIN’s host organisation, said s/he had been 
given a “very clear steer” from ODI’s board that being involved with the Jynwel Foundation 
constituted too great a reputational risk for the institute (Interview, 3 December 2015). The 
visibility of the scandal in media coverage was a key factor here (Dunn 2010). As the 
representative from ODI explained, several members of the organisation’s board were British, so 
news coverage of a visit to Malaysia by UK’s Prime Minister meant that that part of the world was 
“particularly prominent” in their minds at that time.  
 
Shortly afterwards, ODI representatives told IRIN that the institute was no longer willing to accept 
any further funding from the Jynwel Foundation on the news organisation’s behalf (Interview 
Manager 2, 9 October 2015). This was deeply problematic because IRIN had no other structure 
through which it could legally channel funds before it became an independent foundation. The 
formation of a board of the new entity became complicated by these uncertainties, weakening 
organisational commitment between IRIN and its main donor even further (Dunn 2010). The 
Jynwel Foundation then announced that it would only release half of the next tranche of funding 
— enough for a mere three months (Interview Manager 1, 7, October 2015). Furthermore, by late 
autumn, all communication between IRIN and its main donor was taking place through IRIN’s 
host organisation, ODI (Interview, ODI representative, 3 December 2015).   
 
So although the concerns of these stakeholders did not coalesce in the unified manner suggested 
by Dunn (2010), pressure from them regarding their various concerns about IRIN’s relations with 
Low was considerable. It combined with other causal factors, such as perceptions of serious value 
incongruence and weak organisational commitment to bring about IRIN’s decision to part ways 
with the Jynwel Foundation. But why these causal factors combined in this way they did hinged 
upon the visibility of the scandal, including mounting press coverage (Dunn 2010). This is because 
such visibility created unacceptably high reputational risks for IRIN and its allies (Kong & Farrell 
2010). This in turn had important  implications for key stakeholders’ withdrawal of their personal 
and institutional resources (Pfeffer 1982; Pfeffer & Salancik 2003). So we argue that reputational 
risk, and its relationship to the resource dependence of nonprofits forms a missing link in Dunn's 
model (2010): helping to explain why nonprofits may part ways with "tainted donors" despite their 
ongoing economic need. 
 
In November, IRIN managers told journalists that the income from the Jynwel Foundation would 
end on December 31t, and that this would mean that several journalists would not have their 
contracts renewed (Skype conference call, 17 November 2015). IRIN managers explained that the 
relationship with the Jynwel Foundation had come to an end because of the growing visibility of 
the scandal, and the threat that this posed to reputations of the news outlet and its host organisation, 
ODI (Dunn 2010; Kong & Farrell 2010). As the manager who made the announcement put it, 
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The problem is the scandal is so vast now…The reputational risk is larger…because it is so vast and litigations 
are getting closer to Jho. ODI’s appetite for this [continuing to process funds from the Jynwel Foundation] is 
now zero. 
     (Manager, Skype conference call, 17 November 2015). 
  
Journalists were audibly shocked and confused during this call, describing themselves as 
struggling to keep up with the details of the disputes which had taken place at boardroom level 
(Skype conference call, 17 November, 2015). Later on, all of those who were interviewed said that 
although they had known about the allegations against Low, they had never anticipated that these 
allegations would impact upon them. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Accepting foundation funding offers significant opportunities for nonprofit news outlets, but it 
also poses ethical risks.  Taking money from private foundations run by philanthrocapitalists who 
take a highly personalised approach to giving, involves particularly serious ethical pitfalls 
(McGoey 2015). These difficulties are multiplied and magnified when allegations of illegal or 
unethical dealings have been made against a donor. But although such problems are surprisingly 
common in the not-for-profit sector (Dunn 2010; Koehn & Ueng 2010), they have not been 
previously discussed in relation to foundation-funded journalism.  
 
That is not to say that this case study is representative of the day-to-day ethical difficulties 
experienced by non-profit news outlets in their encounters with their donors —it is rather too 
extreme for that. Instead, we argue that the extremity of this case is what makes it so useful 
theoretically, because it enables us to examine just how much it takes for a non-profit news outlet 
to sever relations with a “tainted” donor in a very harsh economic climate (Dunn 2010). Such an 
extreme case study also meant that ethical discussions were  explicit and detailed: so enabling us 
to explore the agentive strategies used by journalists and managers to try and cope. 
 
Specifically, we found that IRIN’s managers justified their acceptance of a pledge from the Jynwel 
Foundation by pointing out the problematic nature of all funding sources—thereby removing 
normative gradability (that is, considerations of what courses of action are better or worse). They 
also engaged in a number of considered defensive strategies, relating to due diligence processes, 
governance structures and organisational statutes. The main thrust of these strategies was to protect 
the organisational and editorial independence of IRIN. Meanwhile, IRIN journalists tended to 
frame any concerns about their donor as personal worries or as a managerial matter, rather than 
seeing donor relations as having a bearing on IRIN’s commitment to public service. So they did 
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not engage in collective ethical discussions about such issues. Moreover, journalists placed so 
much stress on their editorial independence that this seemed to inhibit their consideration of other 
kinds of ethical questions or problems. 
 
However, as the year wore on, news managers became more aware of a number of ethical 
difficulties. Many of these were not directly connected to the allegations against Low, but 
pertained to IRIN’s efforts to engage with the very different world of “philanthrocapitalism” 
(McGoey 2015) in ways which protected its organisational values whilst negotiating its donor’s 
expectation that it generate some commercial income (Bunce 2016; Benson 2017). Rather than 
becoming disorientated in a “benevolent fog” of normative and cultural similarities (Browne 
2010), IRIN’s managers reported the opposite: a lack of familiarity with the norms of commercial 
marketing and advertising, which made them unsure about which ethical boundaries it was 
appropriate to set, and which to compromise upon. Indeed, for a long time, they were unsure when 
differences between themselves and those representing their donor were really due to value 
incongruence (Dunn 2010), or were just expressions of differences in working cultures.  
 
These ethical tensions did not exist in isolation from weak organisational commitment: rather they 
were exacerbated by infrequent and indirect communications with the Jynwel Foundation (Dunn 
2010). Together, these factors shaped managers’ belief that there was no shared vision for IRIN’s 
future, as well as causing them considerable operational difficulties. All of this placed IRIN’s 
relationship with its donor on a very rocky footing. But it was ultimately the visibility of the 
scandal (Dunn. 2010), in combination with these and other factors, which triggered the end of 
IRIN’s relationship with the Jynwel Foundation.  
 
This is because the media coverage of a growing number of legal cases threatened IRIN’s 
reputation, as well as that of its prospective board members and its host institution, ODI (Kong & 
Farrell 2010; Lister 2003). These reputational risks undermined stakeholders’ goodwill, including 
their willingness to allow IRIN to access their personal and institutional resources (Pfeffer 1981; 
Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). So although we didn’t find that stakeholders’ concerns coalesced in the 
unified way suggested by Dunn (2010), our study supports his broader hypothesis that a non-profit 
is more likely to cut ties with a donor if pressed to do so urgently by multiple stakeholders. What 
we add to Dunn’s work (2010) is an explanation of why and how stakeholders do this, by drawing 
on theory about reputational risk and resource dependence. 
 
However, we want to conclude by highlighting three, inter-related points which deserve further 
discussion. The first of these is how vulnerable non-profit news organisations are to being used by 
entrepreneurs for unethical purposes. A few million pounds can make a huge difference to a non-
profit news organisation, but is a relatively small amount for many very wealthy businesspeople. 
Funding even small non-profit news organisations has the potential to offer donors a great deal of 
a great deal of reputational “bang for their buck”: enabling them to generate positive news 
coverage and access networks of other wealthy and well-connected donors. Yet it is very hard to 
vet these donors well as due diligence processes are only as reliable as the data which donors 
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disclose. The managers of non-profit news outlets may also be unfamiliar with commercial actors, 
norms and processes, which can leave them unsure about the validity of their fears and misgivings.   
 
Secondly, this case shows the problems with conceptualising the ethics of news organisations 
largely in terms of journalists’ editorial independence. For although the creation of organisational 
firewalls between donor relations and journalistic activity seems likely to help preserve some kinds 
of critical scrutiny, it risks inhibiting journalists ability to work with their managers to identify and 
discuss other kinds of ethical risks as and when they arise. Finally, this case shows how serious a 
scandal needs to get before a non-profit news organisation will abandon a generous donor when 
they have no other sources of income lined up. To say this is not to single out IRIN for blame: 
other organisations, including the UN Foundation, continued to maintain their relationship with 
the Jynwel Foundation for longer than IRIN did. Rather, we wish to make a broader point: that is, 
that if we believe that journalism about specialist topics like humanitarianism is of public 
importance, then its funding should not be left to wealthy entrepreneurs, who may have their own 
private agendas.  
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